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Publicity and the FDA, An Update
By Shannon E. Johnson
Publicity is a powerful tool. A single Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) press release announcing the dangers of a product can instantaneously al-
ter the consumption patterns of millions of consumers. During the early 1970's,
the FDA's use of publicity became the subject of heightened scrutiny by legal
scholars and practitioners, calling for guidelines and judicial review to prevent
unwarranted damage from the potent instrument.1 This paper will reexamine
the FDA's use of publicity in light of the past 20 years. Following a general
background, the discussion will update the status of agency policy and judicial
attitudes towards publicity, highlight current implications, and oer recommen-
dations.
Authority for Publicity
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act gives the FDA general authority to
shield consumers from dangerous and mislabeled foods, drugs, medical devices
and cosmetics.2 The agency's ability to protect the public hinges on its power
to remove defective products from the market as quickly as possible. Due to
the costly and time-consuming nature of the FDA's two main tools, seizures3
1See Ernest Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity By Administrative Agencies, 86 harv. l. rev.
1380 (1973); Recommendation 73-1: Adverse Agency Publicity, 38 Fed. Reg. 16839; Scott
M. Fisher, Publicity and the FDA, 28 FDC L.J. 436 (1973); Richard S. Morey, Publicity as a
Regulatory Tool, 30 FDC L.J.469 (1975); Edward L. Smith, The Cranberry Scare and Cabinet
Immunity, 16 FDC L.J. 209 (1961).
2Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. xx301-395.
3Id at x334.
1and injunctions,4 which require court approval, the use of publicity has become
an appealing alternative.5 The FDA is one of the few agencies with specic
statutory authority to issue publicity.6 Section 705(a) of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act7 requires the agency to publish reports of all judgments
rendered under the act. More relevant to our discussion is Section 705(b), which
states:
The Secretary may also cause to be disseminated information regarding food,
drugs, devices, or cosmetics in situations involving, in the opinion of the Secre-
tary, imminent danger to health, or gross deception of the consumer. Nothing
in this section shall be construed to prohibit the Secretary from collecting, re-
porting, and illustrating the results of the investigations of the Department.8
The legislative history of the statute demonstrates a congressional intent
to conne the agency to the limited exceptions of \imminent danger to health
and gross deception of the consumer." The rst draft of the statute would
have allowed the Secretary to report all proceedings, even at the initial stage,
and to disseminate \such information regarding any food, drug, or cosmetic
as he deems necessary in the interests of public health and for the protection
of the consumer against fraud."9 The third draft of the Act tempered this
wording, adding a clause forbidding the release of information naming specic
brands of food, drugs and cosmetics except in cases of imminent danger or gross
consumer deception.10 The accompanying record suggests this clause was to
4Id at x332.
5This article only examines the armative issuance of publicity by the FDA, and does
not address the release of agency information or records to comply with the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. x552.
6Gellhorn, supra note 1, at 1408.
721 U.S.C. x375 (1988).
8Id.
9S. 1944, June 6, 1933.
10S. 2800, March 15, 1934.
2protect companies from exposure to pre-judgment censure.11
The agency's statutory authority to issue publicity has expanded in
recent years. In 1988, Congress added a broader statement of FDA power to
issue public information. Section 393 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act now lists among the general powers of the Commissioner: \conducting
educational and public information programs relating to the responsibilities of
the Food and Drug Administration...."12
Benets of Publicity
Admittedly, the benets of publicity are quite substantial. A press re-
lease or a news conference requiring very little time or money can alert the entire
nation to the hazards of a product. Additionally, the FDA can use publicity
to produce \maximum compliance with minimum resources," as manufacturers
who fear adverse publicity will \voluntarily" recall their products to stave o
agency involvement and protect consumer condence in their product.13 En-
forcement statistics demonstrate that recalls have been on the rise, while more
formal sanctions such as seizures and criminal prosecutions have declined. In
1939, the FDA instituted 626 prosecutions and 1,861 seizures, but made no re-
calls.14 By 1989, the number of prosecutions and seizures had fallen to 16 and
144 respectively, while the number of recalls had risen to 370.15
The FDA is clearly aware of the power its publicity can have over in-
dustries, and has publicly acknowledged this inuential role. The agency has
11Sen. Rep. No. 493 (March 15, 1934).
1221 U.S.C. x393.
13James T. O'Reilly, Federal Information Disclosure, x25.02 (2d ed. 1995).
14Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law 1205 (2d ed. 1991).
15Id.
3noted that even before it completes the procedural steps involved in banning a
product, manufacturers have often already changed their behavior based on con-
sumer reaction to FDA's initial announcement. For example, in a proposal to
ban prosthetic hair bers, the agency noted that, due to national publicity of the
agency's press releases, virtually all manufacturers had already ceased produc-
ing and distributing the device.16 Similarly, when banning the use of sultes in
fresh potatoes, FDA said potato processors had already changed their technique
due to adverse publicity.17 Thus, publicity is appealing to the FDA because it
has provided a fast and eective way to carry out its mission of protecting the
public.
Drawbacks of Publicity
While publicity can be an ecient tool for promoting public health and
safety, it can also be extremely damaging to private parties. Because decisions
to issue publicity do not pass through formal procedures, negative announce-
ments often come without notice and without adequate time for rebuttal. Due
to the public's sensitivity to health risks associated with food and medicine,
adverse publicity issued by the FDA has bankrupted companies and devastated
industries. For instance, a single public warning by the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW) in 1959 caused millions of dollars in damages
to the nation's cranberry growers. The so-called \cranberry scare" began a
few weeks before Thanksgiving when Secretary Arthur Fleming announced that
cranberries from Washington and Oregon might contain a weed killer found to
16The proposed ban was thus designed to preventing future marketing of the product, as
current marketing had already ceased. 48 Fed. Reg. 25126, 25136 (1983).
1755 Fed. Reg. 9826, 9831 (1990).
4cause cancer in laboratory rats, even though no specic scientic evidence sug-
gested that cranberries would cause the same eects in humans.18 The HEW
later discovered that the most of the cranberries were safe, but the holiday had
already passed with 99 percent of the year's crop unsold.19 The government
later paid $10 million for losses suered by the growers of the uncontaminated
cranberries.20 Absent the voluntary indemnication by the government, an ex-
tremely rare occurrence, the growers would have been without remedy.21 Other
illustrative examples of crippling publicity include an overstated harm of bo-
tulin in Bon Vivant soup which led to bankruptcy and a sharp decline in sales
of all brands of canned soups,22 and a $6.4 million loss sustained by fruit grow-
ers due to the FDA's statement that the articial sweetener cyclamate caused
cancer in laboratory animals.23 These false alarms demonstrate the negative
consequences of FDA publicity based on erroneous data or overstated risk.24
Not only does adverse publicity come without formal action or notice,
it also leaves disparaged companies without recourse for their losses because
courts are unlikely to grant relief. To begin with, courts have established that
due process does not require the FDA to aord manufacturers a hearing be-
fore disseminating warning information about their products.25 In addition,
sovereign immunity usually shields the FDA from liability for libel and slan-
18Gellhorn, supra note 1, at 1408.
19Id.
20Id.
21The lack of judicial remedy is discussed on page 6.
22See Gellhorn, supra note 1 at 1413.
23The discussion of this incident begins on page 7.
24A separate drawback of negative publicity is that it may unfairly prejudice a defendant in
a trial or trial-like administrative hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Abbott Labs, 505 F.2d
565 ( 4th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 990.
25Hoxey Cancer Clinic v. Folsom, 155 F. Supp. 376 (D.D.C. 1957).
5der suits. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which generally waives the
federal government's sovereign immunity with respect to tort claims for mone-
tary damages, includes a \discretionary function exception" retaining immunity
with respect to \any claim...based upon the exercise or performance, or failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty..., whether or not the
discretion involved be abused."26 The only way around the sovereign immunity
bar is to convince Congress to pass a private bill permitting a waiver of immu-
nity for a U.S. Court of Claims suit. This requires enormous political pressure
and is an extremely lengthy process, as was demonstrated by the California
Canners & Growers Association's 14-year battle for government compensation
that ended in vain.27 Generally, FDA-issued publicity is beyond the reach of a
liability action, even if it is found to be erroneous.28
Even when a case does not fall under the discretionary function excep-
tion, a court may reject a suit based on a failure to satisfy the elements of a tort
claim. For example, many FDA announcements involve a general substance
such as cranberries or cyclamates, and do not target a specic manufacturer
or product name. However, an essential element in a product disparagement
claim is specicity of the product addressed,29 and thus claims by individual
companies based on general announcements usually fail. Courts have also been
receptive to the FDA argument that economic harm results from independent
2628 U.S.C.A. x2680(a).
27The discussion of this incident begins on page7.
28See, e.g. Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc., et al, v. U.S., 46 F.3d 279 (1995), discussed further
on page 8.
29See, e.g., Ajay Nutrition Foods Inc. v. FDA, 378 F. Supp. 210 (D.N.J. 1974), a'd 513
F.2d 625 (3rd Cir. 1975).
6consumer decisions, not agency publications. In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association v. Kennedy,30 the FDA contended that it intended its comparison
of generic and brand name drugs merely as an educational guide for consumers,
not as a charge for industry action,31 while the Association maintained that the
guide was inaccurate and would cause consumers to switch to cheaper generic
brands.32 The court sided with the FDA, nding that any eect on brand name
drug sales resulted from independent public choice.33 Thus, on the whole, courts
have not granted relief to companies devastated by FDA publicity.
Recent Judicial Action
In recent years, courts have followed their usual course of denying ju-
dicial recourse for incorrect agency publicity. Since the 1959 cranberry episode,
Congress has passed only one piece of legislation allowing court review of dam-
aging publicity. A 1984 bill admitted federal liability for losses sustained by fruit
growers resulting from the FDA's \erroneous publicity and misrepresentations"
that the articial sweetener cyclamate caused cancer in laboratory animals, and
called on the U.S. Claims Court to estimate the damages.34 In response, the
court found that, despite the absence of legal liability under the FTCA, Congress
had a \moral obligation" to compensate the California Canners and Growers
Association for $6.4 million in losses from the damaging announcement.35 The
court's report was reversed, however, in 1986 when a review panel concluded




34S.1894 (95th Cong., 1st Sess.).
35California Canners & Growers Assoc. v. U.S., 7 Cl. Ct. 69 (1984).
7that the growers had no legal or equitable basis for their claim because (a) the
statements made by the government ocials were not arbitrary or capricious,
and (b) the fruit growers did not show that the statements actually caused their
losses.36 This ruling seems to imply that courts may not look favorably on
attempts to circumvent the discretionary function exception through unprece-
dented equitable arguments such as \moral obligations."
The most recent case involving FDA's armative issuance of publicity,
a 1995 decision rejecting Chilean fruit growers' tort suit against the FDA,37 also
demonstrates the continued reluctance of courts to respond to the complaints
adverse publicity victims. A group of fruit growers alleged that a laboratory
report citing the presence of cyanide in two Chilean grapes was negligently pre-
pared and violated established procedures. Based on the alleged faulty report
and with knowledge of a conicting report from another lab, the FDA Com-
missioner issued an order refusing entry of Chilean fruit into the country and
issued a press release warning consumers of the cyanide and encouraging gro-
cers to remove fruit from their shelves. The fruit growers contended that, but
for the announcement of the negligent investigation results, the Chilean fruit
business for the spring season of 1989 would not have been destroyed.38 The
majority held that because the plaintis' claims criticized the Commissioner's
decision, their suit was barred by the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA, which was \designed to protect policymaking by politically accountable
branches of government from interference in the form of `second-guessing' by
36California Canners & Growers Assoc. v. U.S., 9 Cl. Ct. 774 (1986).
37Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc., et al, v. U.S., 46 F.3d 279 (1995).
38Id at 283.
8the judiciary."39 While the decision reinforced the government's protection un-
der the discretionary function exception, the six-judge dissent suggested a way
to evade the bar. After conceding that the decision to test and ban the fruit
was a discretionary choice, the dissenters asserted that once the government
makes a policy decision, it must proceed with due care in the implementation
of that decision. Thus, while the decision to test the fruit is beyond the reach
of the courts, the negligent performance of the tests is still subject to judicial
reprimand, the dissenters reasoned.40 The six-judge approval of this reasoning
may bode well for future plaintis seeking compensation for faulty publicity,
although the weight of precedence against judicial review of discretionary deci-
sions is quite strong. It is worth noting that no other decision has replicated
this court's reasoning.
Only one recent majority opinion suggests judicial sympathy for tar-
gets of adverse publicity, and even its rebuke is somewhat indirect. In 1990,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that elastic netting
manufacturers entitled to a hearing on a Food Safety and Inspection Service
(FSIS) ban of their product as an unauthorized food additive.41 Of particular
importance was the court's criticism of FSIS for issuing a press release on the
ban, without prior notice to the manufacturers. The announcement virtually
destroyed the industry: \In one swooping statement, without notice or the op-
portunity to be heard, plaintis lost their livelihood, built over [a] 25 to 30
39Id.
40Id at 291.
41C & K Manufacturing & Sales Co., et al. v. U.S.D.A., 749 F. Supp. 8 (D.D.C. 1990).
9year period...plaintis, frankly, deserve better from their Government."42 This
reprimand, while directed here at the FSIS, could be viewed as a warning for
all agencies to proceed with caution when issuing adverse publicity. Unfortu-
nately, no other recent cases have cited or endorsed this court's position. Thus,
in general, courts continue to refuse the claims of manufacturers who suer the
eects of negative publicity.
Recent Agency Response to Criticisms
As previously mentioned, legal scholars of the 1970's criticized the
FDA and other agencies for their imperfect use of publicity. In response to
suggestions by Professor Ernest Gellhorn,43 the Administrative Conference of
the United States recommended a set of guidelines for agencies to follow when
considering the use of negative publicity:
1. Publicity should be factual in content and accurate in description.
2. For publicity related to regulatory investigations or pending trial-type pro-
ceedings:
(a) Publicity can be used, preferably with advance notice, in cases of signif-
icant risk to the public health or substantial threat of economic harm.
(b) Publicity should be used to provide notice to persons who are aected or
would be interested in participating in a particular proceeding.
(c) Where leaks, FOIA disclosures, or other sources are likely to generate pub-
licity, agencies should use their own publicity to advance public understanding
or accuracy of the media coverage.
3. All other investigations or proceedings should only be publicized after
precautions are taken as to the publicity's accuracy and the agency is sure that
publicity will fulll an authorized purpose.
4. Allegations should be labeled as allegations, subject to later proof, and,
where possible, respondents given reasonable advance notice.
5. Agencies should issue retractions and corrections in the same manner as the
original publicity, when requested, if the person aected shows the publicity to
have been erroneous or misleading.44
42Id at 14.
43Gellhorn, supra note 1.
44Recommendation 73-1, Adverse Agency Publicity (1973), summarized in O'Reilly, supra
note 13.
10The Department of Health Education and Welfare, of which the FDA is a
departmental component, codied these regulations in 1976,45 taking a positive
step towards conning adverse publicity. However, the FDA has never formally
endorsed the recommendations. The agency's main response to the recommen-
dations, a proposal outlining internal publicity policy,46 was never nalized. Nor
has the agency proposed or issued other guidelines regarding its use of publicity,
even though it has diligently codied most of its other general administrative
practices. The agency has published a comprehensive set of regulations gov-
erning its procedures, which detail the operation of formal hearings, advisory
committees, legislative-type hearings, informal hearings, and delineate general
practices and standards of conduct,47 but do not address adverse publicity. In
1993, the agency oered a vague behind-the-scenes look at is procedure for re-
leasing information to the public.48 The Oce of Public Aairs claimed that
its press releases and Talk Papers come from the combined eorts of:
1. the experts in FDA centers, who provide technical information on an
issue;
2. the press skills from the Oce's press sta to convert the technical informa-
tion into language of news people; and
3. the front oce, which approves the content of either piece.49
The FDA has also noted that the Public Health Service and Department
of Health and Human Services often scrutinize its press releases.50 Neither
of these descriptions of the public announcement procedure gives any insight
4545 C.F.R. Part 17 (1976).
46Administrative Practices and Procedures: Publicity Policy, 42 Fed. Reg. 12436 (March
4, 1977).
4742 Fed. Reg. 15553 (March 22, 1977).
48McLearn, supra note 4, at 25.
49Id.
50Id.
11into the criteria the FDA uses to determine when potentially damaging adverse
publicity is appropriate or what level of certainty about risk the FDA requires
before announcing the alleged hazards of a particular product. Furthermore, the
agency has not explained how it plans to respond to HEW's call for a routine
system of prior notication to manufacturers and guidelines for retractions and
corrections. Therefore, the FDA has failed to heed the suggestions of HEW and
has avoided its duty to establish comprehensive guidelines ensuring consistent
and careful use of adverse publicity.
Current Implications of Adverse Publicity
The repercussions of negative publicity have becoming more acute in
this so-called \Information Age." In pre-television, pre-fax machine days, FDA
release of health information took longer to reach a national audience. Common
methods of transmitting information included mailing press releases to medical
journals and other publications, 51 and posting notices in local post oces
in emergency situations.52 Even with a speedier transmission of information
through a press conference, telephone call or wire service, a daily newspaper
would not be able to publish FDA released information until at least the follow-
ing day and would thus leave some time for the FDA to retract faulty statements
before publication. Today, twenty-four hour news networks such as CNN can
report the news as soon as its received. In short, modern technology means bad
news travels faster.
51Wallace F. Janssen, Public Information Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
IV, 12 FDC L.J. 566, 572 (1957).
52As was used to notify consumers of fraudulent cancer treatment claims in Hoxsey Cancer
Clinic v. Folsom, 155 F. Supp. 376 (D.D.C. 1957).
12Moreover, the FDA has taken full advantage of the latest technol-
ogy to expand its media inuence. The agency's Oce of Public Aairs has
grown over the years, and by 1993 , it consisted of four stas handling 300
telephone inquiries per day and issuing approximately 50 press releases and 100
Talk Papers (responses to inquiries about news stories) per year.53 Agency
publications such as the FDA Consumer, which provides news summaries and
feature stories on agency actions, now reach a circulation of more than 25,000
paid subscribers.54 In addition, the FDA has increased the speed and com-
pass of its information dissemination by establishing a free electronic bulletin
board system that contains up-to-the-minute news releases, weekly recall lists,
approvals lists, congressional testimony, speeches and more. The agency now
provides this extensive collection of data on its Internet web site,55 which gives
worldwide access to FDA announcements at the touch of a button. In addition,
the public aairs oce distributes video news releases via satellite to as many
as 700 television stations.56 Consequently, today's FDA announcements reach
a much larger audience in a much shorter amount of time.
Some might suggest that the speed and pervasiveness of current infor-
mation technology actually protects manufacturers against erroneous adverse
publicity because the government has the ability to instantly retract or qualify
its statements. This argument wrongly assumes that the public will heed such
retractions when, studies show that \Exoneration rarely commands the same
53Donald C. McLearn, FDA's Oce of Public Aairs, 48 food & drug l.j. 23,24 (1993).
54Id at 27.
55The Internet site is: http://www.fda.gov.
56McLearn, supra note 4, at 28.
13public attention as a charge of wrongdoing."57 One report found that more
than three times the coverage is given to government assertions of risk than to
assertions of the absence of risk.58 A good illustration of this principle occurred
when the Federal Trade Commission released and then retracted damaging pub-
licity about an antifreeze product. The negative statements were published in
160 newspapers with 20 front page stories, while the agency's admission of error
received no front page attention and was seen in only 80 papers.59 Thus, the
instant and often unretractable eects of modern media outlets have heightened
the damaging potential of adverse agency publicity.
Recommendations
As previously mentioned, the combined lack of established agency pro-
cedures for issuing adverse publicity and judicial review leaves manufacturers
with no recourse from damaging, and sometimes devastating, announcements.
The government has a duty to monitor carefully its use of adverse publicity to
ensure the viability of the food and drug industry that constitutes one-quarter
of our national economy. The nancial demise of just one food or drug manu-
facturer can mean the loss of thousands of jobs and billions of dollars. The best
way to limit the number of damaging mistakes is for the agency to police its use
of adverse publicity through the promulgation of clear and consistent internal
guidelines. Judging from the FDA's prior failure to formalize its publicity pol-
icy, however, the odds for intra-agency improvements seem slim.
57Rushford v. Civiletti, 485 F. Supp. 477, 479 (D.D.C. 1980).
58Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in Risk Control, 24 Environmental Law 887, 906
(1994).
59James T. O'Reilly, Federal Information Disclosure, x25.01 (2d ed. 1995).
14Turning to another possible remedy, external control, Professor Gell-
horn has suggested that Congress enact express statutory authority for limited
judicial review of agency publicity practices, and amend the Federal Tort Claims
Act to allow compensatory relief for victims of unfair and harmful agency pub-
licity.60 Congress has largely ignored these recommendations during the past
twenty years, and has never specically addressed adverse publicity by the FDA
during that time. Congress may fear that holding the government liable for
potentially large damage awards may temper the FDA's zealous eorts to en-
sure public safety. Given inconclusive data on a food or drug risk, the threat
of litigation could color the agency's decision on whether to wait for future test
results, thus possibly imperiling public health. In addition, judicial review may
not even be the most desirable way to help companies recover negative publicity
losses because lawsuits are slow and expensive and outcomes are always uncer-
tain.
Since prior recommendations have been discarded and may not even
be the best solution for the current problem, it's time to look for new solu-
tions. There may be less intrusive approaches that can strike a balance between
the FDA's need to alert the public and the food and drug industry's right to
compensation for government mistakes. Instead of inhibiting FDA's decision-
making process or opening the door to potentially large damage suits, the gov-
ernment could oer low interest loans or tax breaks to industries struggling to
recover from the eects of adverse publicity. This way, the government could
60Gellhorn, supra note 1, at 1432.
15unabashedly warn the public about potential dangers, but if the announcements
turn out to be unfounded, the government could help the industry survive the
storm. Congress could pay for this scheme by charging an application fee to
companies seeking FDA pre-market approval of new drugs (and possibly for
food and color additives), just as the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oce charges
a patent application fee. While it is true that only those companies whose
products require pre-market approval may bear the cost of user fees that all
manufacturers benet from, it is precisely those companies that reap the great-
est benet from FDA approval of protable new drugs. For example, investors
expect Eli Lilly's schizophrenia drug, approved last fall, to provide $1 billion
in sales by the year 2000.61 In addition, it is doubtful that an application fee
would have any deterrent eect on new drug applications, given the potential
windfall that the marketing of new drugs provides.
An alternative approach would be to spread the cost to consumers
through an excise tax on food and drug products. The government can justify
the small charge to the public by noting the daily benets consumers receive
from continual evaluation and announcement of the safety status of various
foods and drugs. The FDA already uses a similar tax in the area of childhood
vaccines whereby an excise tax levied on product sales is used to compensate
children who suer injury from vaccination.62
These suggestions would require substantially more development and
thus their feasibility is not the intended focus of this paper. The presentation of
61Moneyline (CNN cable report, October 1, 1996).
62National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3743, 3755 (codied at 42
U.S.C. x300aa-1 et seq).
16these unconventional approaches merely seeks to demonstrate that, with some
creativity, it is possible to reach a solution that satises everyone's needs: the
FDA can compensate victims of adverse publicity without unduly restricting
the ability of the agency to carry out its mission of protecting lives.
Conclusion
When the Food and Drug Administration proposed guidelines on the agency's
use of publicity,63 pundits predicted that, \The regulated community will have
either a model agency to admire or another disappointment."64 Twenty years
later, the FDA still has not formalized a coherent policy towards the exceedingly
powerful and often devastating tool of publicity, and courts continue to reject
pleas for compensation. All the while, the expansions and innovations in me-
dia technology have drastically increased the power of publicity as a regulatory
tool. If the FDA continues to reap the benets of the modern information age,
it must also address the modern repercussions.
63Administrative Practices and Procedures: Publicity Policy, 42 Federal Register 12436
(March 4, 1977).
64James T. O'Reilly, supra note 59, at x25.02.
17